Blar i forfatter "Sand, Jan Yngve"

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    • Do incumbents have incentives to degrade interconnection quality in the internet? 

      Sand, Jan Yngve; Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2003-12)
      In this paper we analyze the interconnection incentives for firms that have an installed base of customers and that also compete for new customers. We show that the small firm may be harmed in the competition for new customers if the customers in the installed bases are charged a high price, since this makes the large firm more aggressive. It is also shown that the price charged to the installed ...

    • Efficiency in complementary partnerships with competition 

      Sand, Jan Yngve (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-01)
      This paper investigates a market with strictly complementary inputs, with a particular emphasis on how efficiency can be implemented when the productive firms undertake unobservable effort. It is shown that simple linear sharing rules cannot implement socially optimal effort, but a modified linear sharing rule can implement the first-best outcome and a restricted linear sharing rule can be used ...

    • Endogenous technology sharing in r&d intensive industries 

      Sand, Jan Yngve; Clark, Derek John (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2010-01-11)
      This paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred ...

    • Endogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industries 

      Clark, Derek J.; Sand, Jan Yngve (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2006-06-26)
      This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners enjoy perfect spillovers from technology advancements by their coalition partners, but each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively and there is no co-operation in the product market. We show that the equilibrium coalition outcome is one between the two most ...

    • Excess entry in vertically related markets 

      Sand, Jan Yngve (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2003-12)
      This paper considers the problem of excess entry in vertically related markets when the regulator can regulate market structure and access charges. The endogenous access charge introduces an asymmetry between firms which affects the degree of excess entry. I find that the excess entry result of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) does not generally carry over to vertically related markets. It is shown ...

    • Gaining advantage by winning contests 

      Clark, Derek John; Nilssen, Tore; Sand, Jan Yngve (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2020-03-20)
      We consider a principal who faces many identical competitors, and who can distribute a prize fund over two consecutive contests. The winner of contest one gains an advantage in contest two where his effort is more productive than all rivals. We identify a tipping point for the productivity parameter, below which it is optimal for an effort-maximizing principal to place the whole prize in the second ...

    • Management, markets and politics: Statistical screening for historical footprints in Arctic coal mining 

      Østbye, Stein; Sand, Jan Yngve; Westerlund, Olle (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2011-11-29)
      The paper looks at the economic performance of the main (coal mining) company operating in Svalbard based on time series data from 1922 to 2006 and uses statistical techniques to detect structural breaks in economic indicators decomposed into components that the company control or influence and components that are exogenous. The analysis suggests distinctive historical periods and illustrates that ...

    • Nødvendig med en tøffere prisregulering av Telenor og NetCom? 

      Sand, Jan Yngve; Pettersen, Robert (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2009)

    • Petrodevelopment 2030: Socio-economic consequences of an extensive oil and gas development in the Barents Sea 

      Didyk, Vladimir; Arbo, Peter; Nilssen, Inge Berg; Hersoug, Bjørn; Nygaard, Vigdis; Sand, Jan Yngve; Østbye, Stein; Riabova, Larissa (Research report; Forskningsrapport, 2007-10)
      The theme of this report is the regional socio-economic consequences of an extensive oil and gas development in the Barents Sea. The regional focus area includes Finnmark County and Murmansk Oblast. The introductory chapter explains the purpose of the study and the way the work has been done. The next two chapters provide a detailed account of the region and its basic characteristics. The general ...

    • Regulation and foreclosure 

      Sand, Jan Yngve (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2003-12)
      The paper considers the optimal regulation of access charges, and the effect such regulation has on incentives to foreclose downstream rival firms. I show that when a vertically integrated firm is able to discriminate against rivals by means of non-price measures, optimal access charges must be set higher than in the case when no discrimination is possible and will always provide a positive ...

    • Regulation of a vertically differentiated duopoly 

      Sand, Jan Yngve (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2003-12)
      This paper focuses on the optimal quality regulation of vertically differentiated duopolies in the presence of asymmetric information. In the model presented there are cross-effects on the information rent. Contrary to standard single-agent models, the production levels are distorted in favour of the most efficient firm, whose production level is increased under asymmetric information relative ...

    • Why potential entry may increase platform sponsors' profit 

      Foros, Øystein; Sand, Jan Yngve; Kind, Hans Jarle (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-09)
      In this paper we analyze the incentives for platform sponsors to open up their networks for independent rivals. We show that open access may increase the platform sponsors’ profit levels and enhance quality improving investments.